Constitutional Law--Fair Trial and Free Press--State Court Contempt Power by Ziobert, Felix J., Jr.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 4
1967
Constitutional Law--Fair Trial and Free Press--State
Court Contempt Power
Felix J. Ziobert Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Felix J. Ziobert Jr., Constitutional Law--Fair Trial and Free Press--State Court Contempt Power, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 1376 (1967)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol18/iss4/18
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:1376
equitable manner, it is Congress which has the ultimate duty to
eliminate inadequacies by amending the act.
IRA H. MEYER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS -
STATE COURT CONTEMPT POWER
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594
(Ariz. 1966).
In 1964 the Warren Commission warned that steps had to be
taken "to bring about a proper balance between the right of the
public to be adequately informed of civil and criminal proceedings
and the right of the individual to a fair and impartial trial."1
Recently, in Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court,2 a re-
porter employed by the petitioner newspaper company attended a
pre-trial hearing on an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Evi-
dence was introduced to determine whether or not the defendant
should be bound over for trial on a first degree murder charge.
After denying the application and finding that publication of the
evidence presented would be prejudicial, the presiding judge, upon
defense counsel's request, issued an order enjoining publication of
anything that had transpired at the hearing. Although anyone vio-
lating that order was to be held in contempt of court, the petitioner
nevertheless published a report of the hearing. Prior to a hearing
on the contempt charge before the superior court, the petitioner
filed a writ of prohibition3 in the Arizona Supreme Court to stay
the hearing.
The majority opinion held that at such a pre-trial hearing, the
lower court could not, in advance of publication, limit the peti-
tioner's right to print the news and inform the public of the matters
I The Warren Commission came to this conclusion after recognizing that news me-
dia coverage of President Kennedy's assassination could be so pervasive that a defend-
ants opportunity for a fair trial by a jury free of prejudice would be seriously jeop-
ardized because of the premature disclosure of evidence against him. U.S. REPORT OF
THE PREsEDENT's COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSlNATOMN OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KEN-
NEDY 242 (1964).
2 418 P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966).
a The writ of prohibition tests the jurisdiction of a lower court. It is used "to pre-
vent an inferior court from acting without or in excess of jurisdiction [or where) ...
there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy available [to a party]." 1d. at 595.
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which had occurred in open court in the course of a judicial hearing.
The contempt order of the lower court was accordingly held to be
violative of the Arizona Constitution.4 Similar to the protections
of the first and sixth amendments of the federal constitution, the
Arizona Constitution provides that every person has the right to
speak, write, or publish on all subjects' and requires a speedy public
trial in all criminal cases.' To avoid interpretational differences
with the federal constitution, the court, in construing only the state
provisions, reasoned that a "public trial" was a public right. Being
a member of the public, the petitioner attended the pre-trial hearing
as a matter of right. Similarly, his constitutional right of free
speech included the right to publish what had transpired.7 As a re-
sult, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to cite the petitioner for contempt since he was within
his constitutional rights in observing what had transpired in open
court and in publishing the information that was presented.'
Vice Chief Justice Bernstein limited his concurring opinion to
what he termed the direct restriction of the press.' He asserted that
what transpires in the courtroom is a matter of public concern.1"
Therefore, the courts have neither the right nor the authority to
suppress disclosures of the proceedings before them. It is when an
accused is before a tribunal of law that the value of a free press con-
tributes to and assures the integrity of the criminal process. To
allow the court to restrict publications of these proceedings would
undermine the purposes of a free press." Thus, the concurring
4 Id. at 596. It is interesting to note that the court held the order violative of the
petitioner's substantive rights of free speech and press under article 2, section 6 of the
Arizona Constitution rather than on the procedural grounds that the contemptuous
conduct necessarily took place beyond the geographical area of the courtroom. See Nye
v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1940) in which the summary contempt power was limited
to the geographical area in or near the courtroom.
5 ARz CoNsT. art. 2, § 6. The court limited its decision to this section even though
the same rights are protected by the first amendment of the federal constitution. For
the difference in the interpretation of the relevant portions of the Arizona Constitution
and the federal constitution, see text accompanying notes 15-18 infra.
6 Aiuz. CONST. art 2, § 24. Note that § 24 is similar to the sixth amendment of
the federal constitution.
7 418 P.2d at 596.
8 Id. at 596-97.
9 Id. at 597-601. Vice Chief Justice Bernstein did not specifically define the term
"direct," but the context of his opinion reveals his area of concern.
10 Id. at 599. Note that the basis of this proposition is a policy consideration
whereas the majority opinion regards the "public trial" provision of the Arizona Con-
stitution to be a public right. This proposition was also recognized in Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
11418 P.2d at 601. Vice Chief Justice Bernstein stated: "I hold to the assertion
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opinion in Phoenix would require that publication of matters oc-
curring in an open court proceeding, whether pre-trial or trial, be
immune from direct restriction. Unlike the majority opinion, Vice
Chief Justice Bernstein implied that he would have no objection to
alternative restrictions which may have an indirect effect upon the
press."2
Though the essence of the Arizona court's holding establishes
immunity, as a result of the state provisions of free speech'3 and
public trial,'4 for publication of open court matters, the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment makes the first and sixth
amendments of the constitution applicable to the states. 5 The pub-
lic trial provision of the state constitution was interpreted to be a
public right, and thus the petitioner had a right to attend the pre-
trial hearing and a right to publish what had transpired." The
right of the public to be free from secret or oppressive proceedings
is thereby protected, notwithstanding any right of an accused to a
fair trial. In Estes v. Texas,' however, the Supreme Court reversed
the conviction for swindling because prejudicial publicity had de-
prived the defendant of a fair trial. Relying on the notion that a
trial which is public does not necessarily indicate that it is fair, the
Court held that the accused's right to a fair trial outweighed the
news media's right to bring electronic equipment into the court-
room.
18
that full disclosure... contributes to the efficiency and integrity of the criminal process
and believe that the moment we permit other than such full disclosure we are heading
toward the complete and inpenerable secrecy reminiscent of the days of the Star Cham-
ber." Ibid.
12The concurring opinion did not indicate that it would be objectionable to re-
strain others such as police, counsel, and the like from aiding the press in its efforts to
obtain "scoops" or "exclusive stories by indirect means outside of the courtroom or
"behind" the scenes. This seems to be premised on the notion that much information
which otherwise would not appear in a court transcript would not appear in newspaper
print if such information were not available from these persons.
13 AmZ. CONST. art. 2, § 6.
14 ARz. CoNsT. art. 2, § 24.
15 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (recent application of the sixth amendment);
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (first amendment).
16 For the court's discussion of this reasoning, see text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
17 381 U.S. 532, 538 (1965).
18 Ibid. The purpose of the requirement of a public trial was to guarantee that
the accused would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren stated:
[Tihe guarantee of a public trial confers no special benefit on the press,
the radio industry or the television industry. A public trial is a necessary com-
ponent of an accused's right to a fair trial and the concept of public trial can-
not be used to defend conditions which prevent the trial process from provid-
ing a fair and reliable determination of guilt. Id. at 583.
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The protections afforded by a fair trial in Estes were said to out-
weigh the reportorial freedom of the press due to the fact that "prej-
udice" occurred in the courtroom during the pre-trial hearing."9 In
the Phoenix case, on the other hand, the allegedly contemptuous
events occurred outside the courtroom, and the alleged "prejudice"
had not taken place before the trial court acted.2 The basic differ-
ence between the two cases is that in Estes the news media actually
interrupted the court proceedings with bulky electronic equipment,
whereas in Phoenix the reporter was merely present in court taking
notes. Thus, the "public trial" argument provides one constitu-
tional basis for considering the underlying policy issue of whether a
public trial is to protect the public interest in being informed about
the proceedings of its court system21 or to protect the individual's
interest in obtaining a fair trial.22 To understand fully the signifi-
cance of the issue, each freedom must be carefully examined.
Freedom of the press is essential to enlighten a free people and
restrain those who wield power.23 It has proven to be a "catalyst
in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing cor-
ruption among public officers,"' and guarding "against the miscar-
riage of justice by subjecting... the judicial processes to extensive
public scrutiny and criticism."" To allow such worthy functions to
remain unimpeded, the Supreme Court has virtually immunized
freedom of the press from the restraints of the contempt power by
not allowing any restriction of this freedom in the absence of a
"dear and present danger."2
The guarantee of a public trial enables members of the media, as members of the public,
to be present at trial but does not afford them the right to monopolize the courtroom
with media equipment. They may enter as members of the public, and after they leave
the courtroom they may report through their respective media what transpired in open
court
19 Id. at 535-38. The "prejudice' in the courtroom was the presence of the tele-
vision media and its necessary electronic equipment.
20 For the Arizona court's reasoning, in terms of freedom of the press, see text ac-
companying notes 4-8 supra.
2 1 Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594, 596 (Ariz. 1966).
The majority opinion argued that "Courts are public institutions. The manner in which
justice is administered does not have any private aspects. To permit a hearing held in
open court to be kept secret.., would take from the public its right to be informed of
a proceeding to which it is an interested party." Ibid.
22 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
23Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 284 (1941) (dissenting opinion). Note
that freedom of the press was held to include the freedom to publish and to circulate.
Ibid.
24 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
25 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
26 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). To determine whether or not this
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On the other hand, the constitutional protection of a fair and
impartial trial involves equally valuable policy considerations. The
Supreme Court has, in principle, ruled that an accused must receive
a fair trial by an impartial jury which is relatively free of the pre-
conceived biases that can result from prejudicial and inflammatory
news media coverage." This principle is based upon the concept
that the "primary concern of all must be the proper administration
of justice [and] the life or liberty of any individual of this land
should not be put in jeopardy because of the actions of any news
media."28  This concern is a direct result of the constitutional re-
quirement that both the federal29 and state courts" must afford trial
by a jury which not only is impartially selected8' but also possesses
an impartial mental attitude.82 To give the phrase "impartial jury"
its full constitutional meaning, it must be a workable concept.
The danger of prejudicial publicity infringing upon the practical
application of this concept was recently recognized in Sheppard v.
Maxwell,"3 which warned that the "balance... [must] never [be]
weighed against the accused."3" This pronouncement in the Shep-
pard case is in harmony with Estes,"3 which emphasized that the
preservation of a fair trial is the "most fundamental of all free-
doms." 6
Assuming, therefore, that a fair trial by an impartial jury "must
danger exists, the Court must look to the gravity of the evil and discount its improb-
ability before it can find any limitation as being necessary to avoid the danger. Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Under Bridges v. California, supra, this test,
specifically applicable to the contempt power of the court, requires an "immediate"
and "imminent" degree of danger. Another case, Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946), required that this danger be shown by a "solidity of evidence." Id. at 347.
As a result of Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the contempt power of the
states, due to the first amendment, is as restricted as that of the federal courts.
27 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Janko
v. United States, 366 U.S. 716 (1961) (per curiam); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S.
310 (1959) (per curiam).
28 Estes v. Texas, supra note 27, at 540.
29 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
80 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
31 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
3 2 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
83 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
3 4 Id. at 362.
a5 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
36 Id. at 540. Mr. Clifton Daniels, Executive Editor of the Sunday New York
Times, in referring to the right to a fair trial, said: "We are, after all, citizens before
we are lawyers and newspapermen. We have a common interest in preserving the
rights of our fellow-citizens, not to mention our own rights." Daniels, Fair Trial and
Freedom of the Press, 71 CASE & COMMNT 3, 8 (1966).
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be maintained at all costs,"" what measures can the trial court take
to insulate an accused from incriminating or prejudicial publicity?38
In Sheppard the Supreme Court limited the scope of its holding by
setting forth the procedures which were available, but not exercised,
to insulate the accused from the prejudicial influence of the press."9
It was said that the trial court could have controlled or prohibited
the release of leads or extra-judicial statements by the prosecutor,
police, counsel, witnesses, and jurors.40 Or, if the trial court had no
jurisdiction over certain individuals, agencies, or investigative bodies
under city or county authority, the court could have requested ap-
propriate officials to promulgate regulations prohibiting the dis-
semination of information about a case, or it could have warned the
news media about the impropriety of publishing material not intro-
duced in open court.4'
To whatever extent these procedural devices insulate an accused
from prejudicial publicity, they are effective only during the trial
and can exert no direct" influence or coercion upon what the press
37fEstes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538 (1966).
38 The Supreme Court in Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959) (per
curiam) held that a determination of prejudicial publicity must turn on the particular
facts of the case. The following kinds of information are examples of what have been
held to be prejudicial: (1) confessions and admissions, Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); and (2) prior conduct and criminal
records, Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (per curiam).
Many legal writers have deemed other types of information to be prejudicial, if
published before or during trial. E.g., Braithwaite, Fair Trial - Free Press, 38 A.B.A.
RESEARcH MEMO. SmuEs 1 (1966), in which the following are said to be information
of a prejudicial nature: (1) opinions as to the merits of a case; (2) investigative proce-
dures - finger prints, evidence, balistics, and the like; (3) circumstances of the arrest;,
(4) inadmissible evidence; (5) matter excluded from evidence during trial; (6) out-of-
court statements of witnesses; (7) comments upon evidence or credibility of witnesses;
and (8) personal opinions about the accused's guilt. Id. at 12-13.
39 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966). The Court limited its deci-
sion to the indirect procedures. The trial court could have limited the number of news-
men to be allowed in the courtroom. During the trial, the court could have permitted
a change of venue, continuance, sequestration of the jury, or a new trial. However,
the Supreme Court refused to pass on what sanctions might be available directly against
a recalcitrant press. Id. at 358-63.
40 Id. at 359, 361. Such a restriction would have minimal effectiveness in states
which have statutes providing that news media are not required to disclose the source
of their information. E.g., Os-o REv. CODE § 2739.12. The court issuing such a pro-
hibition would have a difficult problem in discovering which individual is responsible
for a "leak" or release of guarded information.
41 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
42 The term "direct" is used to illustrate the similarity of the concurring opinion in
the Phoenix case with the viewpoint adopted in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966). For a discussion of the Phoenix concurring opinion, see text accompanying
notes 9-12 supra.
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may do or publish outside of the courtroom.43 However, in Phoe-
nix44 the trial court attempted to prevent prejudicial publicity
through the use of its contempt power - a means which has proven
to be very effective in England.45 The concurring opinion in
Phoenix46 illustrates that the American system, unlike the British,
has a restrictive postconviction, rather than a restrictive pre-trial,
procedure. The emphasis of the former is to correct, while that of
the latter is to prevent, an injustice that can result from massive
publicity of a criminal trial." Thus, the major distinction between
the American and British systems is primarily a question of
"when."
48
Such a distinction between corrective and preventive measures
need not compel the conclusion that preventive measures are not
available to American trial courts. In Phoenix Vice Chief Justice
Bernstein found merit in measures advocated in Sheppard9 which
may have an indirect effect upon the press.Y° Similarly, the Su-
preme Court in Sheppard held that a trial court could control or
prohibit the release of information or extra-judicial statements to
the press.51 It may be concluded that such a limitation of informa-
tion available to the press is within the area of restraints which sat-
isfy the Supreme Court and the Constitution."
Limitation upon the release of information or extra-judicial
statements is believed to be a feasible way to guarantee a fair and
impartial trial without an infringment upon the freedom of the
press. A sample statute which may enable courts to effectively in-
4 3 For a discussion of the Supreme Courtes view toward direct action against the
press, see note 39 supra.
44 Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966).
4 5 Unlike the American view toward limitation of the press, set forth in text accom-
panying notes 25-26 supra, the English concept allows a liberal use of the contempt
power as a preventive measure to stop the press before it can endanger an accused.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594, 598 (Ariz. 1966) (concur-
ring opinion). In "Hunt v. Clark ... Lord Justice Compton said, 'The question is not
whether technically a contempt has been committed, but whether it is of such a nature
as to justify and require the court to interfere.' " Id. at 598. See Note, A Free Press
and a Fair Trial: England v. The United States, 13 W. REs. L. REV. 147 (1961).
46 418 P.2d at 597.
47 Id. at 599.
48 This distinction is not one of principle but is rather one of operation. See Note,
Fair Trial v. Free Press: The Need for Compromise, 34 U. CINc. L REV. 503, 522-23
(1965).
49 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
50 418 P.2d at 597 (concurring opinion).
51 384 U.S. at 358.
52 For a discussion of this inference, see text accompanying notes 11-12 supra. For
the limitations upon such a measure, see note 40 supra.
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sulate an accused from prejudice resulting from information not
disseminated in the judicial forum is set forth below:
AN ACT TO PROTECT AN ACCUSED'S
RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL
§ 1 Police, prosecutors, parties, attorneys, witnesses, jurors,
judges, and all others engaged or otherwise involved in the
investigation, prosecution, or trial of a criminal matter are
prohibited from releasing information, or making statements
as to the guilt or innocence of any individual accused of
crime or making statements of, or comments upon facts or
evidence which point toward the guilt or innocence of any
accused individual.
§ 2 Any person who endeavors to solicit such prohibited state-
ments from any person subject to section 1 of this act or
who conspires, aids, or otherwise encourages such person to
make such statements shall be deemed to have violated this
act. Any form of publication of such statements will be
prima fade evidence of such violation.
§ 3 It is the duty of the investigatory body, prosecutors, counsel,
police, the court, or anyone under such authority of any of
these, to notify or otherwise inform all others subject to this
statute of their involvement and coverage thereunder.
§ 4 This statute becomes applicable as follows:
A. Section 1 of this act becomes applicable
(1) to the police, prosecutors, and other investiga-
tory bodies upon notification of a possible or
probable criminal act or incident and
(2) to all others within that section upon actual or
constructive notice of their involvement in any
stage of the criminal process from investigation
to conviction or acquittal. ,
B. Section 2 becomes applicable upon any part of section 1
becoming applicable, but only to the extent section 1
is applicable.
§ 5 Nothing in this act shall prohibit the making of any state-
ments to investigatory bodies, the prosecutor, a party's at-
torney, and the court at any stage of the criminal process.
A judge of a court of original jurisdiction may in his dis-
cretion authorize public statements that would otherwise be
banned or prohibited by this act.
§ 6 The penalty for violation of this act shall be a fine of not
more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or imprisonment
for a term not to exceed six (6) months for each offense.
The statute would not be a direct restriction upon the freedom
of the press. It would prohibit designated individuals from releasing,
without the trial court's consent, information not produced in open
court. It would also prohibit all others from encouraging the
defined individuals to violate the statute. Similarly, the statute
would not affect the contempt power or require the Supreme Court
19671 1383
